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1. Introduction
Russell (1913)3 famously characterised the “law of causality” as a harmful “relic of a bygone age”,
and urged the “complete extrusion” of the word ‘cause’ from the philosophical vocabulary. His
justification for this proposal is, in large part, the descriptive claim that physicists, in particular, but
more generally the practitioners of any ‘advanced’ science, do not in fact seek causes, conjoined with
the view that it is no part of the proper business of philosophy to legislate to the effect that they
should. The descriptive claim that ‘advanced’ sciences do not seek causes depends partly on a specific
construal of cause seeking, as the quest for, or assumption of the existence of, “invariable uniformities
of sequence” (1918: 188). It is these uniformities, according to Russell, that belief in the ‘law of
causality’ leads us, erroneously, to expect and also to prize. It is these aspects of Russell’s paper that
provide our point of departure.
We distinguish two questions regarding Russell’s position. First, is it indeed the case that scientists, at
least when ‘advanced’, do not seek ‘invariable uniformities of sequence’? Second, if they don’t, does
it follow that there is no defensible way of saying that they can, or do, seek causes? Our answers are,
respectively, a qualified yes and a no. Our route to these conclusions depends largely on our
distinguishing between three general sorts of question about ‘causation’ (the ‘worries’ of our title) and
defending some definite views about the relationships between the worries, and between the answers
to the questions particular to each area. We begin by introducing the three types of worry: cognitive,
scientific and metaphysical.
2. Three Worries
2.1 Worries ‘cognitive’
It is relatively uncontroversial, even among fierce sceptics about causes in science and metaphysics,
that we think in causal terms.4 Most serious philosophical dispute about causation, that is, centres on
whether we should think causally in science or metaphysics, and if so how we should do so. There are,
of course, a variety of views on what is going on when we think causally, including Descartes’ a priori
approach, Hume’s associationism, Kant’s synthetic a priori. Let us characterise the phenomenon here
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4 Hume: “The appearance of a cause always conveys the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of
the effect. Of this also we have experience. We may, therefore, suitably to this experience, form another
definition of cause, and call it, an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys
the thought to that other.” (Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding section 7, part 2).
2quite broadly in terms of anticipation: some systems in the world (including people, other animals,
plants, other life-forms, and sub-systems within some of them5) allocate their limited resources in
ways that make sense if we attribute beliefs about the relative likelihood of various possibilities (that
is, beliefs about conditional probabilities based on projected6 patterns and regularities), and what
difference this or that behaviour might make.
We regard anticipation in this sense as a cognitive phenomenon, and expect that cognitive science
(including some philosophy) will be able to tell us all manner of things about how (and how well) it
works, how it relates to other cognitive phenomena, how it can malfunction, and in what ways it may
differ across species, learning histories and environments. If we agree that the study of anticipation
can reasonably be called (as it often is) the study of ‘causal cognition’ or ‘causal learning’, etc., then
one general set of worries about causation is just the various ways of wanting to know what is going
on with anticipation, in general or in specific cases.
2.2 Worries ‘scientific’
Russell, as noted, maintains that ‘advanced’ sciences have no use for the ‘law of causation’ and don’t
seek causes understood in terms of that law, going so far as to claim that in such sciences the word
‘cause’ “never occurs”. We consider the question of what to count as an advanced science in more
detail below. For now, whether or not Russell is correct about the relevance of the ‘law of causality’ to
science, advanced or otherwise, we take the following two observations as primary data: First, there
are a very large number of sciences. Second, many of them, perhaps all, explicitly claim to pursue and
provide answers to causal questions. By this latter claim we mean only (for now) the weak claim that
the output of communities of scientists of a wide range of sorts includes papers and other documents
that refer to the ‘causes’ of various phenomena, or the ‘mechanisms’ that ‘produce’ them, or ways in
which various effects can be ‘inhibited’ or ‘prevented’ or how this or that intervention can make a
difference to the likelihood of some outcome. This is supposed to be an empirical claim, although it’s
not obvious just what would count as good evidence for it. At a level somewhat above the anecdotal,
though, consider the following.
We consulted a single issue of Science (volume 300 – June 2003)7 and noted that things referred to as
being ‘caused’, ‘determined’ or being the ‘result’ of something within the first few pages of the issue
(excluding letters, pieces on policy matters and editorials) include ‘broadening of lines’ in
spectroscopy, ‘global extinctions’,  ‘a gradual drop in IOM [Indian Ocean Monsoon] intensity over
5000 years’, ‘an electrical barrier’, ‘how genes are expressed in two closely related species of fruit
fly’, decrease in ‘the reactivity of some state-to-state channels’, ‘efficient, spontaneous cell-cell
fusion’ (p1617), ‘the common cold’ (p1619) ‘oceanic primary production’ (p1625), and ‘pear blister
canker and cadang-cadang disease of coconuts’ (p1633). More significantly, perhaps, in the same issue
there are thirteen full-length ‘reports’. Of them eight explicitly refer to cause, effect, or some cognate
term in their abstract, although in one case the ‘consequence’ is admittedly of a formal property of a
theory. While the remainder don’t use explicitly causal language in their abstracts, the content of each
at least sometimes explicitly refers to causes, or is (sometimes) amenable to being described in causal
terms without serious hermeneutical violence.
A simple search for articles in which the word ‘cause’ appeared in the on-line archives of Science
between October 1995 and June 2003 returned a list of results containing 8288 documents, which
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3indicates an average of just under 90 documents per month in which the word ‘cause’ occurs. ‘Effect’
is more popular – 10456 documents for the same period, just over 112 per month. 3646 documents
include the word ‘influence’, 8805 the word ‘response’, 2683 the word ‘consequence’.8 (In case
anyone was wondering, ‘philosophy’ turns up in 553 documents, just under 6 times a month on
average, or approximately half as often as ‘soil’ with 1007.)
So scientists, it seems, talk about causes, and do so a great deal, and (unless intolerable strain is to be
placed on the notion of an ‘advanced’ science) Russell is simply wrong that the word cause ‘never
occurs’. We take it that what is typically being provided, or attempted, when scientists talk about
causes is causal explanation. A well-established set of philosophical worries about explanation in
general, and causal explanation in particular, arise here, and these are our ‘scientific worries’. We
regard these worries as being focussed on the problem of what makes for a good explanation in a
particular science, in general, or for some group of sciences.
For the purposes of this paper we adopt, without argument, a broadly Kitcherian approach to these
questions. As Kitcher has emphasised, the explanatory relations accepted in any special science are
reciprocal functions of the explanatory schemata accepted in that science. For now, we understand by
‘cause’ in the ‘scientific’ sense, some subset of the parochial explanatory relations peculiar to a given
special science. We also note that some of the sciences are concerned with functional explanation (in a
normative/teleological sense of function) and teleology, and that this shows in characteristic reference
to certain types of causes in their explanations. The sciences in question are the behavioural sciences,
broadly understood. For our current purposes we also take this fact as a primary datum.9
Note here, that the trend manifest in the efforts of functionalist philosophers to turn back behaviourist
and positivist campaigns against reference to agency run in the opposite direction to broadly
‘Humean’10 moves to drain it out in other parts of science and philosophy. (Indeed behaviourism was
inspired by this Humean spirit.) As we will see this provides one source of semantic strain on talk of
‘causation’.
2.3 Worries ‘metaphysical’
There is a set of standard problems about the metaphysics of causation that are not our primary interest
here. They include questions about whether the causal relata are events, facts, features, property
instantiations, tropes, states of affairs, situations, aspects or anything else, and questions about how
many causal relata there are (see Schaffer 2003 for a survey). These problems are all, in various ways,
problems concerning the regimentation of intuitions about the concept of causation; and they will
seem pressing problems only to philosophers who believe that conceptual regimentation is a fruitful
way of arriving at metaphysical conclusions. Such belief lives uneasily with Russell’s project, and
ours, of wondering whether intuitions about a concept of causation identify anything metaphysically
significant in the first place. On the other hand,there are some paradigmatically metaphysical
questions that do not, in being posed, take a general concept of causation for granted, but that can be
seen, and have been seen, as having something to do with causation, and they are the focus of the
worries that are of interest to us.
We take it that the variety of sciences noted in the preceding section is important, and that questions
arise about whether, or in what ways, the findings of various sciences ‘hang together’. No single
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4science, and perhaps not any combination of sciences as sciences, can answer those questions. Three
aspects of the worry about how things hang together that can readily be regarded as having something
to do with causation are the tasks of:
(a) Identifying a unifying ontological structure that justifies the argument patterns accepted across
all of the sciences.
(b) Saying something genuinely enlightening about the ontologies of all sciences by reference to
general structural relations of some kind.
(c) Identifying the ‘glue’ that holds all objective relations in place.11
We don’t claim that there are the only metaphysical worries related to causation. Note, though, that
from a realist perspective (and we’re assuming realism throughout here)12 these are at least among the
crucial metaphysical questions relating to causation. The last of the three is perhaps the one most
clearly associated with causation in the relevant philosophical tradition – what we call glue is, roughly,
what Hume called the ‘cement of the universe’, or has more recently been called ‘Humean bondage’
(Hitchcock 2003).  Much metaphysical inquiry seeks to justify the idea that unification of a scientific
worldview could consist in providing grounds for thinking that there is some one, general, sort of glue.
Such glue, if it exists, must obviously be a generic relation of some sort. If something worthy of the
name `causation’ were this relation, then it would follow that the metaphysician would be positing an
overarching kind of causation distinct from (even if subsuming as instances, though this would itself
require further investigation), the parochial causal relations of the special sciences. It is then a proper
metaphysical question as to whether any such relation actually structures the world.
3. Arguing for Separation
The quick survey of three ways of worrying above is only intended to put some preliminary flesh onto
our claim that there are (at least) three broad and distinct areas in which questions about causation can
be seen to arise. One question that naturally pops to the fore at this point is: what is the relationship
between the three?
Attention to this question will occupy the concluding section of our paper. First, however, we must
spend more time with the differences amongst concepts of causation, and by doing so isolate the
parameters and constraints around any attempt to identify their possible basis for family resemblance.
3.1 Cognitive, Scientific and Metaphysical
‘Cognitive’ questions about causation, recall, arise given the apparent fact that some sorts of systems
anticipate. Around this phenomenon cluster a collection of questions: How do we anticipate? What
exactly is it that we do when we anticipate? Is the cognitive process like an inference, and if so what
sort of inference? How different is what we do when we anticipate to what nonhuman anticipating
systems of various sorts do? How much of what is going on here is learned, and how much innate? Is
any of it unlearnable? Cognitive scientists of various sorts have shed some light on these questions,
Contrary to what some kinds of behaviourist expected, for example, some associations seem easier
than others to learn. Rats, for example, find it easier to learn (and show appropriate anxiety when
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5presented with the stimulus) an association between eating a certain food and nausea, and a loud flash
and an electric shock, than the complementary pairings.13 Developmental psychology, for its part,
already tells us a great deal about the causal (in this cognitive sense of causal) expectations of children
around 3 months old, who are, inter alia, surprised when apparently cohesive objects seem
spontaneously to fragment, to pass through one another, or fail to exhibit a single trajectory through
space and time (Spelke et al 1995). Other work (Baillargeon et al 1995) indicates that at the same age
infants are disposed to find apparently unsupported objects that do not fall surprising. Some headway
is being made with the difficult question of what features of an object’s behaviour and/or structure
lead children to regard it as capable of self-motion, either at all or of various particular sorts (Gelman
et al 1995).
Before starting to argue for separation, one crucial point about our causal thinking (in the sense where
it is an object of study for cognitive science) must be noted. It is not recognizably ‘Humean’ on any
strict construal of ‘Humean’. We take it that a strictly Humean notion, whatever, exactly, Hume might
have thought, of causal thinking would require that effects followed causes infallibly – and Hume did
write of an effect being the ‘infallible consequence’ of a cause.14 He also offered that ‘we may define a
cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed
by objects similar to the second’15 (emphasis added). This is the ‘constant conjunction’ view of our
cognitive processes, which forms a historical ancestor for similar views about cause in science, and the
nature of scientific law. We can also find strong statements of it in, for example, Kant16 and Mill.17
There is ample evidence, though, that we do not think in terms of constant conjunctions at all, but
rather in terms of multiple chains of influence similar to directed causal graphs, or Bayes nets.
Children between the ages of 3 and 5 show the ability, inter alia, to reason to unobserved causes, to
plan suitable novel interventions in response to requests to prevent a process they had only observed in
operation (i.e. one that they had never seen prevented), and to make inferences about the ‘direction’ of
causal dependence in cases of simultaneous change (see, e.g., Gopnik et al, in press). The data are
inconsistent with any simple conditioning or associationist view, effectively demanding recognition of
a human18 capacity to construct causal models at least broadly equivalent to Bayes nets. The evidence
noted above that some associations are more readily learned than others also undermines Hume’s
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6confidence that experienced events are ‘entirely loose and separate’19 or that a person without
experience could form no causal beliefs at all.20
If our actual psychology is not strictly Humean, then arguments pointing out that science isn’t strictly
Humean may fail to establish the sort of interesting or important contrast that might otherwise be
expected. Similarly the temptation to make talk of causes in other areas, including science and
metaphysics, be strictly Humean may lose some of its urgency. How, though, does our psychology,
however it works, relate to science and metaphysics?
Where we say ‘cognitive’ Russell and his contemporaries might have said ‘psychological’.
Furthermore, Russell (1918: 184) objects to one of the definitions of ‘cause’21 in Baldwin’s Dictionary
(1901) that it is psychological, focusing on ‘thought or perception’ of a process where what is required
is a definition of ‘the process itself’. Since the full title of Baldwin’s (1901) Dictionary indicates that it
is a Dictionary Of Philosophy And Psychology, Russell’s complaint that such a work contains some
psychology is a little bizarre. The entry in question also takes pains to distinguish the ‘psychological
treatment of causation’ from the ‘logical’, a detail Russell opts to ignore. In fact the authors of the
‘Cause (notion of)’ entry are quite clear that questions about how science proceeds, or how it should,
are separate from questions about how we, in point of fact, happen to think – one of the very claims
that Russell goes on to defend.
We would like to offer a complementary argument to Russell’s for the conclusion that the
psychological notion of causation should not be allowed to legislate for physics. Russell’s claim is
similar to one advanced by Redhead (1990) who regards the common sense notion of causation as an
unwelcome, anthropocentric intruder in physics. In this Redhead echoes some of Russell’s remarks
(e.g. 1918: 206) about how our expectation that science should discover causes results from our
projecting into it a model of volitional influence he thinks we discover in introspection. Russell, and
Redhead, both argue, in effect, that nothing in physics conforms to the psychological notion of cause,
that physics is fine the way it is, and hence that any difference between physics and psychology does
not mean that physics has to change in any way. We agree, but not simply because some view about
causality is psychological, but because there are good independent grounds for thinking that our
psychology is both pretty impressive, and of limited legislative value in science and metaphysics.
On the first claim, our anticipating systems are probably highly efficient, by any standard, at extracting
and integrating information at the scales and paces typical of our normal embodied lives. We wouldn’t
be here if they weren’t. Not only that, it could be that some kind of folk notion of agent causation (that
is, of making things happen by pushing and pulling, and of there being the kinds of thing that can push
and pull and have reasons for doing so) is part of this makeup. It may even be that having some
version of the folk concept, and applying it to some features of the world, is biologically necessary for
some types of agency, including our own. Even if that were so, it would not follow without further
argument that the folk concept would be a good guide to what should happen in science and
metaphysics. That’s not what it is for.
Furthermore, the ‘folk conception’ of causation manifest in the things we say about what causes what,
and what we anticipate in any given case, may be a less accurate instrument than our non-linguistic
mechanisms for anticipation. It would be so if the production of digitally coded signals required
Procrustean manipulation of the output of the non-digital anticipating systems, and that would in turn
be the case if the requirements for getting an effective digital signalling system going included
drawing fewer distinctions, expressing a smaller number of relationships, etc. (This may be bad news
for conceptual analysis.)
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7We take it that if we indeed have such things as pre-theoretical ‘intuitions’ about cause at all, then
some of them, at least, are facts about the folk conception, and what we say (including to ourselves)
about causes. But then our ‘intuitions’, if we have such things, are evolved mechanisms for getting
around in the world under various resource (including time) pressures, and navigating social games,
not cognitive gadgets designed to produce systematically worthwhile guidance in either science or
metaphysics. That is to say, no matter how things are with science or metaphysics, we contend that our
intuitions are best regarded with cautious suspicion. Here are a few quick reasons for being suspicious
of our intuitions:
First, the distinguishing feature of an intuition is that it be immediate, and particularly that it not
involve inference or reasoning.22 But (and Descartes, for example, knew this perfectly well23) what
counts as immediate depends partly on how much practice we have devoted to something – some of
our ‘intuitions’, that is, will be developmental achievements, produced by long training. (There is, in
this light, something at least faintly absurd about philosophers of all people, after years of very
specialised training, and with highly developed skills in ritualised forms of debate, claiming to have
such things as ‘pre-theoretical’ intuitions at all.)
Second, there is reason to think that what counts as anyone’s intuitive (in the sense of immediate,
unforced) response to a question, including a ‘causal’ question, is subject to cultural variation.
Although data in this area is often subject to controversy, there is a growing body of evidence that
adults in different cultures engage in strikingly different causal reasoning (See Morris et al 1995 for a
survey). These often manifest in different ‘intuitions’ – Chinese and American newspaper reports of
very similar local multiple murders differed strikingly in the extent to which they referred to
dispositional properties of the perpetrator (more common with Americans) and situational ones (more
common in Chinese reports). Further, Chinese and American subjects in an experimental task
involving counterfactual judgements about the murders had differing views about what sorts of
changes (dispositional or situational) would have been likely to prevent the murder.
A possible response to here would suggest that some sort of ‘core’ human notion of causation could
perhaps be recovered, even allowing for the fact that environment, including cultural environment, can
play a role in constructing distinctive local manifestations of causal thinking. That seems reasonable,
but it does not damage our key point. That point is that naked appeals to ‘intuitions’ about causation
are not innocent moves, and that difficult work, not typically undertaken by philosophers who often
seem very confident of the universality of their own intuitions, would be needed to establish what
counted as the ‘human’ intuitions on such matters. And even then, a justification would be needed for
thinking that intuitions were worth appealing to at all.
Third, data that might plausibly be taken to indicate what our intuitions are in various cases can, and
sometimes does, show that they are depressingly wrong by the lights of our scientific and
mathematical theories of the relevant domain. Again, interpretive controversies about some of this
data rage on, but it seems reasonably clear that people are, when relying on their intuitions, relatively
poor at judgements about conditional dependence (as measured in the Wason selection task),
probability (where many people will assert that the conjunction of two possibilities is more likely than
one of the conjuncts alone) and in other areas, compared to communities of scientists. The very infants
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8who seem to have pretty solid expectations about what an object can do, turn out to be rather bad
judges of how shadows cast by objects should behave, for example being surprised when a shadow
moves at the same time as the object apparently casting it (Spelke et al, 1995). Our response in such
cases is not to take the mathematical theory of probabilities, or logic, or the laws of optics to have
been impugned, and nor should that be our response. One way of thinking of this last point is as
follows. Just as the cognitive scientific study of vision has enabled us to explain some visual illusions,
so the study of causal cognition in a scientifically informed setting might be expected to show us that
we were prone to some ‘causal illusions’ (Gopnik et al, in press). In a Dennettian spirit we propose
that the proper task of philosophy and science in cases of causal illusion is to explain the answers
people give to some causal questions, rather than to try to make the answers turn out to be correct.24
Having said all that, something remains to be added in defence of our capacities for causal cognition.
They are, as noted, probably highly efficient. They can plausibly be seen as providing a good first
approximation to a science of ‘goings on that an ape like that needs to pay attention to and make many
successful predictions about’. We can also allow that folk-physical and folk-psychological
explanations could both be first approximations of sciences. But being that isn’t the same as being
serious guides to science or metaphysics.
A possible objection to our conclusion would be to point out, or argue, that cause talk plays an
important pedagogical or pragmatic role in science.25 We’d be willing to grant such a role, but
maintain that doing so would not significantly undermine our main point, but rather reinforce it: even
if some idiom or way of expressing scientific work was cognitively useful to us, it would not follow
that it was more than useful. We also warn against making the supposed cognitive properties of the
single individual the bottleneck through which scientific discovery and justification must pass.
Through the division of intellectual labour, and augmentation of our cognitive abilities by sensory and
other prostheses, communities of scientists come to have cognitive powers quite different from those
of single individuals (See Hutchins 1997 for an account of collaborative cognition in a navigational
setting).
In our discussion thus far we’ve allowed an ambiguity between at least two sense of science to pass
unresolved, and we hope without serious consequence. The ambiguity is between science as a practice,
and science understood in a realist mood as a body of claims about the mind-independent objects of
scientific enquiry, whatever they may be. Bringing that distinction into the foreground, though, is to
raise metaphysical questions explicitly, and it is to the connections and differences between science
and metaphysics that we now turn.
3.2 Scientific and Metaphysical
To begin with, we need a little more detail regarding science. From one perspective the survey of
Science magazine described above shows very little. Russell could indeed by wrong about the word
‘cause’ being used in science, yet either be correct that it shouldn’t, or be correct that when it is, the
‘law of causality’ is not what is being invoked. We’ve said, and maintain, that when scientists refer to
causes they are attempting causal explanations. To defend this claim we need to consider the substance
of Russell’s description of science.
Russell’s more serious claim regarding scientific practice, when one leaves aside the question of what
words are used, is that scientists don’t seek causal laws, when that is understood to mean seeking laws
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9of invariable succession. More specifically Russell says that this holds of ‘advanced’ sciences. (Of
course if an advanced science just is one that makes no reference to causes, or at least has no use for
the ‘law of causality’ then Russell’s claim is true by definition.)
Russell’s argument depends, then, on taking a scientific (causal) law to be a law of invariable
succession – that is holding scientific practice up against what Cartwright later (1980) called the
‘facticity’ view of laws. Russell in effect anticipates Cartwright by pointing out that laws thus
understood have numerous counterexamples, although instead of emphasising their resulting
falsehood, focuses on the features of scientific practice that both produce many of the
counterexamples, and show the inadequacy of the facticity view of laws. So, Russell concedes that in
the ‘infancy’ of a science (1918: 188) the principle of same cause same effect may prove useful (he
does not say how), but maintains that every advance in science is a move away from such simple
formulae, and towards understanding phenomena in terms of more complicated, mathematically
specific and time-symmetric,26 forms of interdependence, for which the law of causality is unsuitable,
and which Russell therefore thinks should not be called ‘causal’ at all.
Russell’s position does not involve commitment to anything like Cartwright’s more recent view that
the world is ‘dappled’ and that fundamental physical laws are to be regarded with suspicion (1999). In
fact Russell takes (to put it in current terminology) the failure of the facticity view of laws to be worse
news for the facticity view than for the laws themselves. He contends that while at most needing the
‘law of causality’ as a prop in its early stages, any science assumes the ‘uniformity of nature’ (1918:
194), and grants that controlled conditions under which constant conjunctions are observed can be
useful in the discovery of the relations of interdependence that he takes mature science to seek. Mature
science, on his view, tends to produce ‘a greater differentiation of antecedent and consequent’ and a
‘continually wider circle of antecedents recognised as relevant’, leading to a view of the relationships
between measurement values at times and places, where simple generalities about regularities in the
actual flow of events are at best of limited practical value and minimal theoretical interest.
We agree that this picture is roughly correct, and observe that when contemporary scientists talk about
causes what they are typically doing is documenting that kind of relationship. Although Russell’s
descriptive claim about what scientists say may be incorrect, he can be read as making the prescriptive
proposal that doing that isn’t seeking causes, and that the fruits of such work shouldn’t be understood,
or referred to, as finding ‘causes’. We, though, don’t see that anyone, philosopher or otherwise, is
holding a trump the playing of which enables them to tell scientists that when they’re seeking the sorts
of relations of interdependence they do, they aren’t seeking ‘causes’, or shouldn’t say that they are.
One objection here might be that the work of scientists does not involve seeking ‘Humean’
uniformities, and that since that is what ‘cause’ refers to, scientists are mis-using the term. But if we’re
correct that our own psychology isn’t Humean in that sense (3.1 above) then one key temptation to
make event regularity definitive of causation disappears. Furthermore, suppose that, in the spirit of
Russell, we sought in science for something rather like our own causal cognition to check whether
what goes on in science should be called causal. Then, we suggest, we’d find analogies as well as
differences – neither we nor science rely on constant conjunctions, instead we both consider co-
determination by multiple factors. On the other hand we seem committed to the unidirectional
determination of the future by the past, a notion that finds no comfortable home in many scientific
theories. So if our own psychology is to exert any regulative pressure on what scientists can call
causes, the question seems open; and furthermore we don’t think it should exert such pressure.
                                                       
26 That is, being time-reversible, and not having any theoretical home for the notion of the direction of
causation from past to future that seems central to (at least) the folk notion of causation. We agree with
Field (forthcoming) that the lack of past-future asymmetrical dependence in fundamental physics is not
Russell’s main argument against the relevance of causes to science.
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A more difficult objection would insist that the problem of distinguishing genuinely causal from non-
causal processes is, at least partly, a metaphysical problem, and hence that metaphysicians should have
something to say about whether scientists are behaving appropriately in referring to causes.
Recall the three tasks we identified as aspects of the overarching metaphysical worry, in realist mood,
about how things hang together, each of which can be understood as being related to causation:
(a) Identifying a unifying ontological structure that justifies the argument patterns accepted across
all of the sciences.
(b) Saying something genuinely enlightening about the ontologies of all sciences by reference to
general structural relations of some kind.
(c) Identifying the ‘glue’ that holds all objective relations in place.
The first question is most strongly associated in the recent philosophy of science with the work of
Philip Kitcher (e.g. 1976, 1981, 1982, 1989), the latter two with that of Wesley Salmon (e.g. 1984,
1994). We begin by briefly glossing each programme without, for reasons to be discussed shortly,
making direct reference to causation.
Kitcher has argued that ontological unification, within one special science or across two or more of
them, consists in the justification of common argument patterns that hold within or across the
science(s) in question. (An argument pattern is a set of ontological and structural primitives featuring
recurrently in the explanans of accounts given in the unified domain.) Kitcher (1989) characterizes his
work as analyzing `top-down’ explanation, where phenomena are explained by having their roles in
wider ensembles of regularities fixed. He contrasts this with `bottom-up’ explanation, the sort
analyzed by Salmon.
According to Salmon, science aims to discover the structure of the world. In his (1984) he attempted
to say something enlightening about the ontologies of all sciences by reference to general structural
relations holding, at a micro level, between all real objects and processes. He argued that some
processes transmit information about their antecedent stages, while others do not, and that those which
do are genuine processes, the others mere pseudo-processes.
Tasks (a) and (b) are most naturally seen as complementary, and also the two most readily understood
as having no essential connection to causation. Task (c), though, is deeply associated in the
philosophical tradition. What we call glue is what Hume called the ‘cement of the universe’ and,
furthermore, Salmon’s project was in part an attempt to wrestle seriously with Hume’s epistemological
challenge, to say how anyone could know, by any amount of observation, which links between
processes are causal and which are not. Salmon’s process account is supposed to show that we can, at
least, observe something that is precisely diagnostic of causation.
With Salmon and Reichenbach (1957)27 we can describe this in terms of the transmission of marks. In
the absence of specific structure-preserving (and constituting) activity, entropy will eliminate marks
on objects that carry information about their histories. More generally we can describe this in terms of
negentropic information.28 A structure is, by definition, something that resists entropy, at least briefly.
                                                       
27 It is worth noting that Russell himself provides a crucial inspiration for process accounts of causality in
his (1948). Some of the connections are described in Dowe
28 As Dowe (1992) pointed out, and Salmon (1994, 1997) accepted mark transmission cannot be
fundamental since some real processes cannot be marked. Dowe’s conserved quantity version of the
process view does not have this limitation. Our preferred approach, equivalent to Dowe’s with respect
to the mark-transmission problem, is Collier’s (1999) which makes information, but not marks,
fundamental. Neither Collier’s nor Dowe’s approach rely on counterfactuals in the formulation of their
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Therefore, wherever marks are preserved we have structure. The goal of science is to discover the
structures in nature.
`Structure’, furthermore, admits of rigorous, and realist, account. Wherever local negentropy is high
(Schrödinger) we have an information channel. Some such channels are exploited for convenience by
local limited information-processors (such as ourselves), but are ontologically redundant, in that the
information they carry is recoverable by reference to structures of greater computational depth.
Information channels that would have to be used, by any physically possible information processor, to
describe all events and regularities are real patterns (Dennett 1991). These are the structures that
science seeks to discover.
But what about causation? Notice that, as intended, the process view enables putatively causal claims
by special scientists to be subjected to a critical test. Those which pick out real processes could be
causal, those that don’t, can’t, because they don’t pick out real processes of any kind. So when special
scientists seek causes in their domains of enquiry and get it right, whether they know it or not, they
find ways of picking out real informational relations. That is to say, if macroeconomics, for example,
has its own notion of ‘macroeconomic causation,’ and process views are correct, then this notion will
turn out to correspond to some specific informational relation, one that really holds on the general
topology of the universe. Saying this does not entail saying anything specific about how an isolated
macroeconomist might reason her way to a generalization.
That process views have this payoff when it comes to distinguishing real from pseudo processes
counts in their favour. And if we’re allowing that when scientists seek causes they may indeed be
seeking true causal explanations even if they’re not hunting Humean regularities, then process views
turn out to play the right regulative role with respect to science, without undermining the explanatory
autonomy of specific sciences. Does that mean that process views are best thought of as analyses of
causation? We contend that it does not, and that instead it is an open question, depending on a
semantic decision, whether to construe them as analyses of causation. There are considerations
weighing in on both sides.
One argument against regarding process views as analyses of causation can be dispensed with
relatively quickly. Kitcher (1989) criticizes Salmon (1984), by pointing out that our identification of
causal processes and causal interactions in most, probably all, macro-processes depends more on our
knowledge of the general causal structure of the macro-world than it does on the sorts of micro-
process that are paramount for Salmon. However, while such considerations give good reason for not
attempting to extract methodological guidelines29 for conducting the business of the macro-sciences
from process accounts, they do little to undermine the value of Salmon’s approach and its descendents
when they are understood as saying something about the kinds of real structures in the world that
science aims, in the limit, to discover. Or, more directly, a fair point about explanatory priority in
science need not by itself establish anything about fundamental ontology.
As hinted at already, there is an argument in favour of regarding process views as being precisely
about causation, and that is that they are the heirs of a philosophical project, descending from Hume,
through Russell (1948), Reichenbach and others seeking to purge folk elements from the concept of
causation in favour of an analysis giving priority to considerations arising from fundamental physics.
The tension between how things are with fundamental physics and how they are with the folk notion,
that is, can be interpreted in at least two ways. Redhead (1990) explicitly acknowledges Russell (1918)
when developing his own argument for the thesis that talk of causes has no place in physics.
                                                                                                                                                                          
basic concepts, thereby lacking a recognized limitation of Salmon’s (1984) approach. While important,
these refinements within the process programme are not crucial for our purposes here.
29 Except, at least, for the imperative not to traffic in parochial information-transmission relations that are
spooky according to fundamental physics.
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In what sense does the event consisting in the object having fallen a distance s1 at t1 cause the
object to reach s2 at t2? … The position at t1 can hardly be cited as the cause of the position at
t2. Surely the cause must be something that is introduced to account for why the position of the
object has changed. Well, is not the answer to cite the acceleration? But the acceleration is just
defined by the kinematic relationship expressed in Galileo’s law. So can the cause be
Galileo’s law? But Galileo’s law is not another event which happens at t1, `causing’ the
particle to move with constant acceleration and so to reach s2 at t2. It is just an expression of
that acceleration. So should we not retreat to citing the force, such as gravity, which `causes’
the acceleration? But the idea that forces `cause’ bodies to move is a very anthropocentric
notion (Redhead 1990: 146).
Redhead here is granting physics priority in telling us how the world is, but allowing the folk notion
priority when it comes to fixing what is to count as a cause. As a result, like Russell, he argues that
nothing in the world discovered by science corresponds to the folk notion,30 and urges its elimination.
We’ve already indicated some reasons for rejecting the view that the folk notion is a regularity notion.
For now note that, whatever kind of notion it is, a possible response to any difference between the
practice or content of science, including fundamental physics, and the folk notion, could be to give
priority not only with respect to how the world is, but also to what causes are, to science. In that case
one would say that the folk are wrong about what causes are, and that even if what goes on in physics
is strange or unfamiliar, it is where we’ll find out what causes really are.
In opposition to this argument giving semantic priority to process analyses of causation, understood as
heirs to Hume’s project of removing folk elements from the concept, though, are heirs whose ancestry
goes back to the very folk notions that process analyses undermine. Most striking here are
functionalist approaches to mind, and in the behavioral sciences more widely. We noted their
existence, and their position of tension with respect to Humean approaches including early
behaviorism, in section (2.2) above. So semantic ancestry does not give unequivocal support either for
or against regarding process views as analyses of causation, and we are still faced with a choice
between taking Salmon’s ‘real causal processes’ to be a subset of the real patterns, implying that only
microphysics identifies metaphysically ‘genuine’ causes, or, following Kitcher in regarding any non-
redundant explanation that picks out a real pattern as identifying a genuine cause, thereby analysing all
scientific causation in terms of real patterns.
The choice is if anything more tricky for the metaphysician working in a Quinean spirit, and
considering how to identify the ‘glue’. Appropriating a familiar word that is also used in science, such
as ‘causation’, could seem like an exercise in telling scientists what to think. Invoking a folk concept,
on the other hand, would involve making folk intuitions epistemically relevant to metaphysics, which
we’ve argued is a bad idea and is also un-Quinean. Our preference happens is to call the glue
‘information’,31 and allow scientific practice to trump both folk and philosophers’ usages with respect
to what gets called ‘causation’. There are at least two complementary ways of defending this
preference. In other, ongoing, work with others, we motivate it by a survey of high-level theories
across several sciences and conclude on the basis of this that an information-theoretic metaphysic can
directly unify an impressive range of otherwise ontologically disconnected explanatory frameworks.
Here, we will take another tack, one more traditional amongst analytic philosophers. That is, we
explicate Russell’s own response to the problem raised and diagnosed in his essay, and see where it
leads us with respect to the semantic impasse we have just identified.
                                                       
30 Developing his charge of anthropocentrism, Redhead continues: ‘There is no such thing as a non-natural
motion. To most physicists the old-fashioned idea of cause arises from the idea of our interfering in the
natural course of events, pushing and pulling objects to make them move and so on. In modern physics
there are just regularities of one sort or another’ (1990: 147).
31 Recall that, consistently with the point being made about ‘causation’, we use ‘information’ in a way that
gives scientific semantics precedence over folk semantics.
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4. Letting science hold trumps
At the end of the previous section, we found that methodological percepts we called `Quinean’ left us
conflicted over what to do about the failure of fit amongst folk, scientific, and metaphysical concepts
of `causation.’ One option, of course, would simply be to declare and define analytic distinctions to fix
three notions of `causation1,’ `causation2’ and `causation3’. This is the kind of `solution,’ however, that
invites satire of analytic philosophy. As a more substantial problem, this approach achieves such
resolution as it can through simply bypassing questions about the relationships among the concepts. If
we have succeeded in persuading the reader that there is not just one monolithic concept of causation,
then going on to inquire into interrelationship amongst the resulting family of concepts seems the truly
interesting philosophical topic to pursue.
We noted that the problem is made interestingly hard under the discipline of a `Quinean’ attitude to
philosophical method. This attitude is, of course, the view that it is science, not a priori philosophical
reflection, that should be entrusted with the primary role in populating our ontology, and that it is
reflection upon the history of science that should guide epistemology. The stance gets named after
Quine because he gave it vivid and repeated stress. However, both Carnap and Reichenbach defended
the same perspective earlier – and ahead of them was Russell, in the very essay that inspires the
present one.  “Dr. James Ward,” Russell complains, “ … makes [it] a ground of complaint against
physics [that] the business of those who wish to ascertain the ultimate truth about the world … should
be the discovery of causes, yet physics never even seeks them. To me, it seems that philosophy ought
not to assume such legislative functions …” (1918: 173). On the basis of this meta-principle, says
Russell, the conclusion we should derive from the absence of reference to causes in mature physical
theory is that “there are no such things” (Ibid).
On questions about conflicting grounds for semantic usage as between science, metaphysics and folk
practice, then, Russell’s preference is clearly to let science hold trumps. As we have seen, however, it
greatly overstates the facts to say that scientific papers don’t advance many of their explanations in
terms of causation, even if the concept indeed drops out of the formal statements of physical theories.
Given this fact, it seems that if we can find no over-arching concept of causation supplied by any of
the historically plausible sources – physics, philosophy, or everyday expression – then we must
suppose that each special science invokes its own parochial causal notion, so that we will have to
provide analysis not just of `causation1,’ `causation2,’ and `causation3,’ as above, but of `causation1’
,…, `causationn’! Undertaking that task would surely justify satire.
If brute conceptual splitting is, then, a route to analytical bankruptcy, it seems that our only hope lies
in trying to find a suitably abstract conceptual foothold from which we might try to state something
that various concepts of causation have in common. We have already given reasons for denying that
folk intuitions could provide such a foothold; though from whatever foothold we find, if we can find
one, we ought to be able to say something about the relationship between those intuitions and the other
understandings of causation. Our Quinean commitments preclude a search for the foothold from a
priori principles. And we have argued that if we simply induct directly over scientific practice, we get
the very disconnected medley of concepts we hope to organize. We seem to be stuck.
Some recent philosophers, such as Dupré (1993), would welcome this impasse as evidence for
fundamental disunity of science. We suggest, however, that Russell, despite his general empiricism
that makes the very idea of metaphysical organization suspicious, can help us see how to relax our
apparent bind. As a reductionist about the relations among the sciences, Russell can let physics trump
quite directly. As we have already noted, on this basis he inclines to the view that our cleanest
semantic reform should be to dispense with causation as a serious scientific idea. However, Russell’s
empiricism is not relentlessly consistent. Thus we also find, running throughout his essay, a less
metaphysically cautious route to the same conclusion. He argues that because the functional
generalizations of physical theory involve no temporal asymmetries, whereas causation as understood
in the anthropomorphic sense depends on such asymmetry, the universe itself cannot have causal
relations as a feature, except in the sense that the universe includes cognitive systems and cognitive
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systems achieve anticipation by constructing causal relations.. The premise about physics here is
rooted in classical theory, but this is unimportant in the present context. The important point is that
Russell’s argument vacillates between a purely epistemological one to the effect that causal concepts
are unjustified in science, and one that draws an ontological conclusion about the non-existence of
causes from the assumption that a certain sort of physical theory is descriptively true.
Now, Russell’s lifelong inconsistency as between empiricism and realism, reminiscent of Locke’s, is
famous. Our Quinean stance allows us to be realists about objects of scientific reference if, on
independent grounds, we wish to be. Thus if we were also prepared to follow Russell in his
assumption that (unless dualism is true) physics directly fixes the scientific ontology, and if we
thought that contemporary physical theory cites no causal relations, then we could embrace Russell’s
eliminativist conclusion straightforwardly. This, however, would finesse our original problem quite
illegitimately. That problem is generated by the prolixity of parochial causal relations in the special
sciences. Letting physics determine ontology directly simply denies the ontological significance of this
fact. However, we don’t think the actual practice of science justifies such reductionism. All it does
justify is a much weaker principle to the effect that physics provides epistemic constraints on other
sciences. In particular, it is a consistent methodological principle across the whole history of modern
science that no special science may offer explanations at time t that contradict the generalizations of
whatever is roughly or nearly consensual amongst physicists at t; and there is no symmetrical
constraint in the other direction. Elsewhere (Ross 2000, Ross and Spurrett forthcoming), we have
discussed this as `the primacy of physics constraint.’  If physical theory abjured reference to causal
relations but biology or economics invoked them, this would generate no contradiction, so the
constraint would not warrant inference from the hypothetical fact to Russell’s conclusion.
We will now argue, however, that the constraint does pack enough punch to allow us to take Russell’s
reasoning as a template, requiring us only to complicate it a bit. Better still, the complications in
question will yield a conclusion much less radical in its revisionary implications for the special
sciences than Russell’s own. Put in terms we introduced earlier, the constraint will provide the
foothold for conceptual organization we were looking for. The constraint is strong enough to tell us to
look to physics for general ontological structures – so we don’t have to violate our self-imposed
Quinean discipline by resorting to a priori analysis. If there is universal glue, and if the nature of that
glue can help us see what the various concepts of causation have in common, then perhaps we can find
it in physics after all.
Is there something that can explain the force of the primacy of physics constraint other than the sort of
mereological reductionism presupposed by Russell? We have argued elsewhere (Ross 2000, Ross and
Spurrett forthcoming) that the answer is `yes,’ and that the something in question is just a pragmatic
fact about the organization of inquiry, rather than an a priori metaphysical hunch. We have many
disciplines that study temporally and/or spatially bounded parts of spacetime. They are, by fiat, not
responsible for finding generalizations that support counterfactuals outside of those boundaries. Then
we have one discipline, fundamental physical theory,32 that is responsible for supporting
counterfactuals across the entire physical universe, whether this is taken to be infinite, as in classical
physics, or finite and limned by space-like and time-like singularities, as in relativistic physics.33
                                                       
32 This is not coextensive with all of physics. Some branches of physics can be special sciences in the
sense just given. We are here defining `fundamental’ by reference to what we take to be a real working
convention in science.
33 The infinite classical universe raises special epistemological (inductive) problems for the principle of
full counterfactual support that do not arise in the finite relativistic one. In the second case, we can
invoke a sensible degree of verificationism and absolve science of responsibility for information lying
across singularities that can’t, in principle, be retrieved. We can thereby avoid some issues that tie
Russell in deep knots towards the end of his essay. Einstein’s universe is a far less perplexing place in
which to be a philosopher than Newton’s.
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Saying that a measurement from anywhere is a potentially relevant counterfactual to fundamental
physics is just a fancy philosopher’s way of stating the asymmetric primacy constraint.
Let us now take a few argumentative steps which mirror Russell’s reasoning exactly, and none of
which depend on the mereological reductionism we won’t allow ourselves. We of course never
actually have the full set of generalizations, good across the whole universe, at which we aim in the
limit, because some parts of that universe are, at any given time, inaccessible to our measurement.
This includes all points outside of our collective lightcone, particularly, at any given time t, all those
points later than t along the time-like dimension. But it is rational to project the logical character of the
generalizations in the limit from the sample we have at t. Now suppose, hypothetically, that none of
the generalizations in the sample invoke the kinds of causal asymmetries characteristic of the folk
concept of causation. Suppose that some or all of the parochial special-science causal principles do
presuppose such asymmetries. Then: because special sciences are scope-restricted and metaphysics,
by definition, is not; and because our Quinean rule prohibits our seeking metaphysical premises from
anywhere more general in scope than fundamental physics, it follows that whatever concept we use to
organize the special-science causal concepts, if there is any such concept to be found, cannot itself be
a causal concept.
Is there such a non-causal organizing concept for causal concepts to be found in fact? We are going to
propose `information-transmission’ as such a concept. Before we do so, however, we must point out
some subtleties without which our argument here will be misunderstood. First, while we think it
possible to argue that information is the best current candidate for the role of the famous `glue’ (Ross
et al forthcoming), we will not be pressing this direct metaphysical conclusion now. Here we are
staying close to Russell’s project and restricting ourselves to analysis. Second, in the full metaphysical
voice we are keeping quiet here, we in fact think, following Collier (1999), that information-transfer
actually does reduce all causal concepts as a matter of ontology. This is because, in that voice, we
deny Russell’s premise that the current sample of physical generalizations – our t being of course
importantly different from Russell’s – respects his principle of functional symmetry. But our subject
here is just causal concepts as these feature in the relations between the three ways of worrying, and
this subject is more abstract than any specific metaphysical thesis that must, in Quinean spirit, rely on
some contingent facts about the actual physical universe as we find it.
From this abstract perspective, Russell’s hypothetical universe shares at least one key feature with any
actual one, whether or not our special theory of the latter is right. In the limit from which the whole
general structure of that universe would be surveyed, it must be a Paremenidean `block universe’
(Capek 1976). That is, all general relations amongst all spacetime points must there appear on one
static topology. It follows from this that if causal concepts depend on real processes, then causal
concepts cannot be required to specify the topology. Put metaphorically, if `causation’ is for
identifying `goings on,’ then a conception of the ideal of physical theory like ours and Russell’s can
allow for no non-anthropocentric goings-on in the limit. Russell stresses this point at length, leading
him to conclude his essay with reflections on its implications for the free will problem. These
reflections of his are conditioned on special inductive difficulties raised by the idea of a (classical)
infinite block universe, and so need not detain us here. What interests us are the implications of a
limit-conception of a block universe, as the target subject of physical generalizations, for the nature of
the concept that might be used to in turn organize causal concepts.
Once notions of `process' are deleted from the concept of causation, as in a block universe they must
be, what remains? We can see, looking from a godlike perspective at the overall structure, that from
any more limited perspective within that structure only restricted information is accessible. A billiard
ball, let us imagine, is at spacetime coordinates (sx, …, z, t1) and also at (sx',…,z', t2). The field equations
that determine the topology of the universe will have as implications that at t1 the ball could not have
received information from any points tx>1, or any information from spacelike separated points s
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sufficient to distinguish sx',…, z' from sx", …, z".
34 No observer may explain the ball's trajectory by
reference to informational relations amongst its locations that can't physically obtain. Perspectivally
restricted observers  with cognitive capacities, who can process more information than the ball can,
may of course be able to predict its location at t2 from t1, though they can't simulate the godlike
observer in the limit and locate its entire trajectory if this is sensitive to complex microdynamics that
they can't compute, or that are in fact irreducibly statistical. If the object is a cat, or a grain of pollen in
the sea, or an electron, instead of a ball, then the observers at t1 will have correspondingly less
information about its location at t2 than the godlike observer, depending on the information-gathering
sophistication of their physical theory at t1. How much information about its location at t2 the electron
itself can have at t1 is a contingent consequence of the structure of the universe, but if Copenhagen
quantum theory is both complete and true then our current physics already supplies the answer to this
question. The physical theory in the limit answers the question by definition.
The point of the foregoing is to illustrate our contention that what remains of causation as a physical
concept once it is bleached of process notions in a block universe is a physical concept of
`information.' We say `a' physical concept rather than `the' physical concept because there is more than
one exact candidate. All candidates are conceptually descended from that of Shannon and Weaver
(1949), but developments in computation theory since that time have introduced various possible
refinements, and important philosophical issues are raised by efforts to choose among these for
application in metaphysics. Elsewhere, we ourselves use the refinement promoted by Collier (1999).
However, at the abstract, purely analytical, level of the present discussion we need not go into these
details. Our claim here is just that in the block universe of physics-in-the-limit, information is the
appropriate organizing concept for the various special-science and folk concepts of causation. We will
now go on to say, in general, how this organizing can work. Given the rules we have set for ourselves,
our proposal accomplishes something if and only if the organizing does not imply reductionism of
special-science kinds and relations to physical ones.
We here make use of earlier work by Ross (2000), building on Dennett (1991). Pressed to defend the
possible reality of intentionally characterized states in a way that implies none of reductionism,
eliminativism or anthropocentric instrumentalism, Dennett introduced the idea of a `real pattern' in
terms of informational compressibility. Ross (2000) works up a more precise formulation of Dennett's
idea as a definite theory of existence as follows:
To be is to be a real pattern, and a pattern is real iff
(i) it is projectible under at least one physically possible perspective
and
(ii) it encodes information about at least one structure of events or entities S where that
encoding is more efficient, in information-theoretic terms, than the bit-map encoding of S, and
where for at least one of the physically possible perspectives under which the pattern is
projectible, there exists an aspect of S which cannot be tracked unless the encoding is recovered
from the perspective in question.
This theory's reliance on physically possible perspectives makes it realistic rather than
antropocentrically instrumentalistic, since it abstracts away from actual, contingent observers and
appeals ultimately to the sort of physical theory in the limit discussed above. Its reliance on physically
possible observers makes it non-idealistic, and captures the primacy-of-physics constraint in a way
that respects our Quinean refusal to acknowledge the possibility of any justifiable conceptual
                                                       
34 These are of course contingent facts about the topology, not a priori principles. In our examples, we just
assume absence of paths for backwards time-travel by macroscopic objects, and, when we discuss a
case involving electrons below, absence of quantum tunnels. If the actual universe does include these
things, they will be reflected on the topology of its block representation.
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framework that has wider empirical scope than that of fundamental physics. At the same time,
however, it avoids the implication of reductionism. Many real patterns will be detectable only within
small bounded regions of spacetime and so will be invisible to generalizations captured in terms of the
kinds and relations of physical theory. Echoing Russell (1918: 189) in our terms, perhaps one must
restrict one's attention to the surface of the earth after the dawn of life to encode and project
macroeconomic patterns, and to a much smaller span of centuries and locations along that surface to
encode and project the pattern constituted by the person of Napoleon.35 Since we define fundamental
physics as the science that takes patterns detectable from anywhere in the universe as its subject
matter, it follows that physics will not be constructed so as to be able to pick out macroeconomic or
Napoleonic patterns. Furthermore, as detection of these patterns may require cross-classification of
physical or other patterns, no element of reductionism is implied by the theory at all. Meyering (2000,
see also Menzies 1988) defends anti-reductionism of this sort in terms of `multiple' and bi-directional
supervenience, and we are pleased to note that Russell (1918: 191-192) anticipates this point very
closely in his discussion of possible causal interpretations of the relationship between mind and matter
in the block universe. Ross and Spurrett (forthcoming) dissolve Jaegwon Kim's (1998) `causal
exclusion' argument for reductionism about mental states in just this way.36
Now, to the organization of causal concepts.37 Our analysis explains why parochial causal concepts are
more robust in special sciences than in physics, and also why they are ineliminably parochial. First,
special sciences, by definition, are not cast from the vantage point of the limit. By this we mean not
only that they aren't cast from the physical limit; they also aren't cast from the limits achievable at
their own scope boundaries. Thus, although their causal claims can be translated into information-
theoretic relations on a block representation as analytic exercises, this has no empirical point: special-
science accounts are accounts of what are, for their retailers, ongoing processes. Descriptions of
information-transferring processes in terms of process and `flow' just are full-blown causal accounts
(Barwise and Seligman 1997; Collier 1999). Of course, it is true that actual physical theories, unlike
the ideal physical theory, are not cast from the limit either, which is why causal concepts play an
ineliminable role in doing physics, as opposed to writing it up for the ages. We eliminate causal
concepts from very formal statements of physical generalizations, where and if we do so, for the sake
of making their logical commitments as regards counterfactual support more transparent. Second, it is
because special sciences are concerned with relatively isolable regions of spacetime, which involve
cross-classification from the perspective of the limit, that the causal relationships on which they
variously focus will appeal to different aspects of their information-carrying potential. This emerges as
Kitcher's point that explanatory argument patterns distinguish special sciences, and are reflected in
parochial restrictions on what kinds of relations count as causal for each of them.
Finally, we can make sense of the relationship of folk causal concepts to scientific ones. Ross's theory
of existence makes it a necessary condition on a pattern's reality that it not be informationally
redundant in the limit. When actually formulating scientific theories short of the limit, we cannot know
that our posited patterns would satisfy this criterion, but we care whether they do, and so we make our
existence claims at least implicitly provisional. Furthermore, as science progresses we adjust our
ontology in accordance with our concern for ontological parsimony. However, practical folk have no
systematic reason to be interested in this constraint. Nor could natural selection attend to it when it
designed the native anticipatory apparatus used by the practical folk. In coping with problems of
scarcity, process is almost everything. Attention to wider informational dynamics in which processes
are embedded typically deliver few if any additional payoffs, or even gets in the way of payoff
                                                       
35 That is, no temporal coordinates prior to those coincident with Napoleon's childhood are relevant, and at
some point in the future his existence as the distinctive pattern he was (`was' here being indexed by us
now, rather than by the examiner of the block universe) will cease to make any informational difference
to anything. At some point, that is, he is `forgotten' not just by people but by the universe!
36 We regret that when we wrote that paper we had not yet noticed Russell's prescience on the issue.
37 [CONFERENCE NOTE: From here on there are various points of contact (and conflict) with Hue
Price’s projectivist pragmatism, and opportunities for direct reference to his position.]
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maximization because of computational costs.38 Therefore modeling causal relations as sequences of
collisions of objects in time is a sensible heuristic. Furthermore, for social animals like people, or even
mobile asocial animals that prey on and/or are preyed on by other mobile animals, it might even make
sense to model all causal relations on volition, with rocks then being treated as limiting cases of
agents with minimal sophistication of purpose and adaptability. Such models of causation of course
won't generalize when one tries to do science, that is, when one's scope of concern widens beyond
what nature could build us to worry about. New worries, we conclude a bit tritely, motivate new
concepts.
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